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Andrea Sabisch/Sten Mellenthin*  
 
Recording and Representing Aesthetic Experiences in 
Diaries 
The term ‘aesthetic experience’ has become a cipher of the unspeakable in a 
sensual and meaningful in-between over the past decades. While different 
times have positioned the subject area of aesthetics at different proximities of 
art, aesthetic sensations can, in principle, be triggered by any object – they 
are, in fact, not exclusive to art. If taking ‘Erfahrung’ (experience, sensation) 
literally, the ‘motif of ‘Fahrt’ (travel, journey)’ still exerts an attraction that 
reminds of the odysseys of one Ulysses, the ships of the Flying Dutchman, 
the rudderless death-barque of Kafka’s ‘The Hunter Gracchus’ or Rimbaud’s 
‘Bateau ivre’, which all drift ad infinitum. Herein, the symbolism of a life’s 
journey shines through alongside a desire to travel. (cf. Frank, 1979: 30) 
In this article, which summarises some of the results of my research on 
‘The Manifestation of Aesthetic Experiences in Diaries’, I attempt to show 
the impossibility to access experience directly and only is thus far communi-
cable as a practice (Sabisch, 2007). By using students’ recordings of their 
experiences I create a method of translating experience at the intersection of 
its art-pedagogical and qualitative-empirical representation, or, respectively, 
of art and pedagogy. 
The documentary method of interpretation reconstructs the translation 
processes in recordings as experience and empiricism. Therein lies its exem-
plary as well as controversial nature. 
Aesthetic Experience – a Consensus? 
Although today’s German art pedagogy is characterized by its many posi-
tions rather than ‘by a systematic unified approach’ almost every author in 
the field of art pedagogy is using one central term: ‘aesthetic experience’. It 
not only appears in most of the German framework plans on various levels of 
education but also is still used in the current discourses on arts, cultural edu-
cation and education theory. 
 
 
 
 
* Translated into English by Sten Mellenthin 
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Georg Peez, teaching art pedagogy at the University of Duisburg-Essen, even 
suggests that ‘the connection to aesthetic experience’ represents a consensus 
in the discipline and ‘the central prerequisite of processes of aesthetic educa-
tion’ as well (Peez, 2002: 19-21). 
But what does this consensus comprise? What does the term ‘aesthetic 
experience’ mean? 
Keeping these questions in mind, I began the research for my disserta-
tion by looking for art-pedagogical facets and contexts of the term ‘aesthetic 
experience’ in order to sift the field of art pedagogy since the 1970’s. After 
encountering the usual difficulties of German art-didactical literature re-
search – bad keywording of journal articles, barely any bibliographies, no 
database containing most of the art-pedagogical publications – many of the 
independent art-pedagogical texts came without a reference to a discourse or 
source. Additionally, it became clear that most of the texts had a completely 
different understanding of ‘aesthetic experience’ ranging from production as 
well as reception processes, sensual as well as reflective moments, conscious 
and subconscious, material and imaginery, productual and processual as-
pects. While reading the German literature, I often felt that the texts rather 
reflected the author’s preference and affective approach to art pedagogy than 
the specific processes of aesthetic experience. 
I was unable to find a consensus in terms of a concise definition of the 
concept or the consistent reference to some definable modifying moments. 
But, the consistent use of the term for more than three decades, both in prac-
ticable teaching and learning contexts as well as theoretical reflection, could 
qualify as a consensus as such consistency is hardly to be observed at all in 
such heterogeneous fields. 
On another level of interest, the term ‘aesthetic experience’ serves as a 
placeholder or, more elegantly put, a cipher of an unspeakable. What this 
cipher stands for in the context of art pedagogy, what potential for integra-
tion it possesses for whom, what it sets free, conceals or which sacrifice it 
denotes could all be worthwhile questions for further research. 
Regarding the matter at hand, however, I find it notable that the cipher 
‘aesthetic experience’ refers to extremely diverse doorways to art pedagogy 
by its frequent but first and foremost affectively charged approach. This 
affective use of the term is neither a specific in the field of art pedagogy, nor 
is it historically self-evident. It has rather become apparent in the concepts of 
the term ‘experience’ which have stressed exactly this affective notion of 
experience itself since the turn of the 20th century. Before I will elaborate on 
this in the section ‘Relevance’, I shall reveal a possible understanding of 
‘experience’ in the following excursus. 
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Experience 
In favour of a more methodical approach to describe the term ‘experience’ in 
its complexity, I will resort to philosophy as a discipline of reference to art 
pedagogy. I will mostly be referring to the works of phenomenologist Bern-
hard Waldenfels, which exemplify a contemporary phenomenological posi-
tion that defines ‘experience’ as fundamentally affective and corporal. 
In ‘Bruchlinien der Erfahrung” from 2002 (‘Break Lines of Experience”; 
from here on cited only by using bracketed page numbers) Waldenfels de-
scribes the paradoxical structure of experience, which I can only illustrate 
here very abridged. It is mainly comprised of two interrelated poles, which 
are separated by a break. He labels the one pole of experience ‘Pathos 
(Widerfahrnis)’, translated as ‘experience’ or ‘affect’, and the other ‘Re-
sponse (Antwort)’, translated as ‘answer/ response’. As ‘break’ does not 
simply refer to a spatial gap, but literally means ‘to stand apart’ and hence 
includes a temporal dimension, Waldenfels chooses the more precise word 
‘diastase’. 
 
 
 
What does it mean? The rather banal example of a disturbance shall serve as 
an illustration: In the moment of being disturbed by a shrill sound, I have not 
yet identified it as a ring tone. For an instant, in the affect, I startle. But as 
soon as I interpret the sound as a ring tone, i.e. I assign meaning to it and 
place it within my frame of reference, I am already responding. Only hereaf-
ter can I switch the mobile phone off as a consequence of this interpretation. 
Between the instances of being startled and classifying, before we assign a 
meaning to something, a gap yawns to which we do not have access: a break. 
 346
Affect 
These disturbances, which specifically exemplify the inaccessibility of the 
‘pathos’ while touched by the unknown, can trigger certain experiences, 
prevent others or occur within the experience. How much they differ in in-
tensity and thereby how strong the experience they trigger is, depends on 
how far beyond individual expectations or how far removed from the organi-
sation of everyday life they are “in relation to our susceptibility to distur-
bances and our defence mechanisms” (p. 33). Examples that could be cited 
here range from simple everyday occurrences to pathological experiences 
such as traumatic injuries or shocks. Their common ground is the impossibil-
ity to describe the unknown and the known as opposites of psychological 
interior and physiological exterior instead of their interpenetration. 
During the Widerfahrnis (affect) “something appears before it can be 
grasped, understood or rejected. The experience of a disturbance must not be 
confused, however, with the subsequent interpretation of an event as a dis-
turbance and our respective defence mechanisms, which we use to regain our 
composure.” (p. 33) Thus, affects happen (to us). They are instances in time 
that we can only interpret in retrospect. Affects themselves do therefore not 
have meaning yet. In themselves, they are without meaning (cf. Waldenfels, 
2004: 133). When, in extreme cases, they paralyse us, it is not because of 
their meaning, i.e. their manifestation as something, but rather because they 
defy our sensual expectations by exceeding our order or sensual organisation. 
They can be “[so far beyond] our powers of comprehension as to shatter our 
world” (p. 33). 
Break Lines of Experience 
The transgression occurring at the break line of experience marks the limits 
of our abilities to comprehend and of any kind of interpretation. Significant 
in this respect is the fact that something happens within these breaks and that 
new differentiations are formed. Waldenfels uses the term ‘diastase’ to de-
scribe how this complex process of differentiation can be understood as a 
spatio-temporal shift: “‘diastase’ denotes a process of differentiation, in 
which that, what is being differentiated, only emerges” (p. 174). The concept 
is thus “closely related to Deleuze’s and Derrida’s use of the terms différence 
or différance. It does not merely describe an act of distinction in which one 
thing is set apart from another, but a process of separation, which is related to 
parting, seclusion and passing away” (p. 174). This process happens to us but 
is beyond our control. 
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In order to label and distinguish the different break lines of experience, Wal-
denfels calls a ‘significant difference’ a manifestation of something as some-
thing, a ‘representative difference’ something that stands for something, an 
‘appetitive difference’ something that is wanted in another and ‘responsive 
difference” if we respond to something (p. 175). 
The spatio-temporal shift can be understood better by imagining that 
time and space also emerge during this process. Only then does the idea of 
diastase acquire “a radical temporal meaning if we imagine the occurrence of 
an affect in unity with the subsequentness of the effect that produces a re-
sponse” (p. 178). This refers to a synchronicity inherent to break lines. But 
there is much more to it. “The shift does not only carry a temporal quality, it 
also gives time itself its very idiosyncratic imprint” (p. 179). It means that 
within this rift not only space and time are formed, but also the self and the 
other. 
This ‘non-place’, which is created by the spatio-temporal shift and which 
“cannot be marked on any of the present temporal fields” (p. 180) also repre-
sents “the location of the imperfection, which eludes all creation of meaning 
and ambition and yet causes that there is something to say and do” (p. 60). 
Imperfection 
The philosophical discourse regards our non-accessible motivation to live 
and make experiences as something that derives from the kind of imperfec-
tion described above. Different times, however, had their own understanding 
of this imperfection as is being documented by several philosophical texts as 
well as impersonations of imperfection, for instance in Greek mythology and 
literature (cf. Eros). 
According to Waldenfels, the imperfection derived “more and more from 
absence” (p. 50) since the early modern times. An initial absence thus trig-
gers our desire (French: désir), i.e. a dynamic process of withdrawal that 
sparks our pursuits and aspirations (Latin: appetitus) again and again. 
Embedding imperfection in an affect-rooted concept of experience has 
numerous forerunners. In the 20th century, the psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud 
“put a new weight” (p. 302) on it. He understood this absence not only as the 
absence of the other but much more radically as absence or deprivation of 
oneself. In contrast to Freud, who, by reference of the terms ‘the uncon-
scious’ and ‘repression’, saw imperfection as something past, the German 
philosopher Ernst Bloch (1885–1977) understands the anthropological mean-
ing of the unconscious in the sense of a temporal pre-occurrence. In his re-
nowned introduction to the Tübinger Philosophy – ‘I am. But I do not have 
me. Therefore, we will yet become.’ – he takes up this affective foundation of 
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experience. Therein, he describes imperfection as a not-yet-having based on 
such a deficiency of ‘having oneself’. The imperfection as a not-yet-having 
marks Bloch’s (and later in time Lacan’s) cognitive interest that aims at char-
acterizing the unconscious as a preconscious, as pre-occurrence. Both ap-
proaches, however, debate the affective-based attentiveness, which cannot be 
simply uttered nor can it be perceived ‘immediately’ or as an entity like John 
Dewey (1859–1952) has done in ‘Art as Experience” from 1934, a much 
cited work in the field of German art pedagogy. 
Although the points of contact between the philosophical and psychoana-
lytical discourses are much more complex than can be illustrated here, both 
poles of not-yet and not-anymore (primal repression) have their relevance as 
epistemological cornerstones. On the one hand, they stand for different di-
mensions of imperfection as ‘not-knowing’, or absence respectively. On the 
other hand, they do not simply represent an imperfection, but also a “bor-
der-knowledge, i.e. an experience of deprivation or an absence within a pres-
ence” (p. 299). 
For Waldenfels the fragility of experience is all about this affective bor-
der-knowledge. According to him, this border-knowledge emerges as a re-
sponsive difference between that what strikes us, and that what we respond 
to. Since I have already described Waldenfels’s idea of pathos above, by 
using the example of a disturbance, I will now elaborate on his concept of 
response, which he sees as a genuine part of experience.  
Response 
Each response creates a connection with something that has attracted, stirred, 
struck, moved, in short: affected us. The philosophical discourse often uses 
terms such as meaning, desire, intention, attention or affection with regard to 
these connections. They are beyond our control, but govern and guide us. 
By following Waldenfels’ perception of response from the perspective of 
personal affect, its pathic hue, i.e. the influence of what initially attracted us, 
shines through. The directions our efforts take are determined by our atten-
tiveness. In this process, the self becomes the norm of the reference as well 
as the deprivation. 
How is this to be understood? The self should be perceived as initially 
split, only emerging through the interaction of reference and deprivation 
within the diastase. Self-deprivation motivates the self to a self-reference. 
This process of referring is driven by a ‘force’, namely the ‘attraction’ 
(Latin: attentio) that passes over into interpretation. Differently put: ‘Desir-
ing, I am driven by something that is wanting, that deprives itself and in that 
affects as well as touches me”; by perceiving this ‘being touched’ as some-
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thing, I have already interpreted it (Waldenfels, 2004: 221 and 136). The 
interpretation, in turn, is part of the response. Thus, any perception and ex-
perience begins with a something that attracts us or which we respond to. 
In the diagram above (fig. 1), the arrows mark the spatio-temporal shift. 
This serves to illustrate that our responses to affects cannot be seen as mere 
reflections of the events, but rather that experience in itself is fragmented and 
subjected to shifts. 
This rift within an experience shifts time and space, the self and the 
other, as those, while responding, reappear elsewhere as the other in a new 
co-relation. It is through this shift that they experience themselves in time, 
which a posteriori appears as a before and after, suggesting that there existed 
such a thing as an immediate, total presence in the experience. Thus, the shift 
implies an initial subsequent quality of responding: “Only in responding to 
whatever affects us the affect itself comes to light.” (p. 59). 
What makes Waldenfels’s model of experience unique is the fact that it 
stresses the genuine fragility of experience and that it shows the shift that 
emerges through the response. While hermeneutics has mostly interpreted 
experience as the experience expressed through language, Waldenfels’ idea 
of response leaves the question of how experience is articulated unanswered. 
His model thus expands the 20th century’s idea of an antagonism be-
tween a hermeneutic, linguistic-reflexive approach and a phenomenological 
one based on the analogy of the gaze. In contrast to Derrida’s idea of writing 
as the prototype of response, Waldenfels renders the linguistic response as 
one mode of response – how experience is articulated or visualized – equally 
possible as he does for situational-physical or visual responses. 
Relevance 
For the educational practice, I see the relevance of this affective-based, 
physical concept of experience in its scope to describe experience as the 
transformation of a suffering and indulging self into a responding self. Ex-
perience is invisible. We can neither observe it nor access it directly. It 
eludes our consciousness. We therefore need an intellectual handrail to en-
able us to communicate about affective, emotional, pre-linguistic and pre-
conscious phenomena, which form the basis for any attentiveness and learn-
ing. 
This is not without consequences for educational practice, as it means 
that experience can no longer be perceived as a promising or original entity. 
On the contrary, the paradoxal structure of physical experience dissolves old 
dialectical divisions of body and mind, theory and practice, nature and tech-
nology. By strengthening the in-between of attentiveness, this construction 
allows for the self to be seen not just as an active being that is at our disposal 
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whenever we want it to be. Instead, the self-related sensual affect of the self 
is taken seriously. This kind of teaching method starts out from what attracts 
our attention, what motivates us and what we respond to (cf. Woo, 2007). 
Yet, we know shockingly little about aesthetic interests and specific de-
sires of expression (cf. Goetz, 2004: 372; Seydel, 2005: 168). 
Bearing this in mind, an ‘education’ (Erziehung) seems obsolete which 
implies that we, the teachers, always know what and how learners still have 
to experience. It will rather give way to a ‘Bildung’ (formation) of the self, 
which is inseparably tied to the experience of unfamiliarity (otherness). (In 
that, we will never be unemployed). The unfamiliar (non-own) precedes the 
familiar (own) by exceeding our regulatory framework and affecting us. It 
breaks the ‘circle of being oneself”. 
If we understand such a process of self-formation (Selbstbildung) as 
something that occurs through media, we arrive at an intersection with the 
field of art pedagogy. And more: The transformation of what affects us into 
something we respond to creates – so my thesis – exactly that in-between 
where aesthetic self-formation can genuinely begin. This in-between always 
is already governed by individual attentiveness and provokes the ever new 
venture to respond. 
This is a radical proposition in so far as aesthetic experience would not 
just represent one mode of experience among others but rather form the basis 
for or motivate all kinds of experience. Since we have no control over the 
affect it always raises questions about the limits of teaching.  
Furthermore, the physical, affective figuration of the fragmented experi-
ence becomes relevant in that it makes possible ‘applications’ plausible for 
both art pedagogy and qualitative empirical research. This shall be discussed 
in the following chapter. 
Application of Experience 
Since we have no direct access to (aesthetic) experience, I will translate the 
question of what experience is to how it can be represented in order to be-
come communicable. The question of how to communicate about experience 
in art classes is essential for a pedagogy (educational science) that takes an 
interest in the learners’ own aspirations and their questions. 
In contrast to the one-sided, exclusively theoretical approach which de-
fines ‘characteristics’ to form a rigid matrix for educational or empirical 
reconstructions and evaluations, I will use the term ‘aesthetic experience’ – 
just as the collaborative research centre of the same name in Berlin – as a 
dynamic placeholder in order to be able to also examine the ‘applications’ of 
experience (cf. Mattenklott, 2004: 18). 
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One possible way of applying and thus updating experience lies, I think, in 
the (albeit impossible) attempt to record it. By recording experiences, we 
transfer them into a medium and thereby make the differences and break 
lines accessible through the medium.  
However, processual recordings of experience only make sense if we 
understand them as a practice of responding to affects. Without the object of 
experience, writing or recording processes in a teaching environment become 
as useless as an experience, which cannot be communicated without depic-
tion. Therefore, I will use the term ‘application’ to describe a practice of 
responding as the translation of experience. (cf. Pazzini, 2000) 
This kind of practice of responding will then be aesthetically turned if we 
transform what affects us – with regard to its mediality, materiality and tem-
porality – into what we respond to. (cf. Oudée Dünkelsbühler, 2000: 55;
Pazzini, 2000) Therefore, an aesthetic application of experience must be seen 
as ‘a matter of representation, imagination, substitution, mediatisation and 
(re-)presentation” including all their limitations. (Meyer, 2003: 13) It is the 
aspiration of teaching arts to make this aesthetic dimension accessible to 
experience and to communication. 
Art-Pedagogical Application 
I will use the term ‘recording’ in order to sketch a method of textual and 
visual representation in art pedagogy, which can be perceived as a practice of 
responding. 
This practice is especially important in the context of research- and prac-
tice-based learning, as this method focuses on the formation (Bildung) of the 
self. As a form of self-oriented, self-organized learning, research-based 
learning assumes an existing interest of the learner that manifests itself in the 
questions they have and in their methods used. It is therefore quite remark-
able that the interrelation between research-based learning and the use of the 
term ‘aesthetic experience’ has not yet been examined; despite the fact that 
both discourses have been debated for the past 35 years in Germany. 
In the following, I shall attempt to further outline my definition of re-
cording and its use in other contexts. I will then try to answer questions as to 
what extent experience and recording processes are interwoven and how they 
can become communicable. 
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Recording  
The term ‘recording’, which I use synonymously with the meaning of the 
suffix ‘-graphy’ (from Greek gráphein: to write, etch, draw) is used here to 
denote practices of notation and documentation, which accompany learning. 
These practices include both content (as in biography or cosmography) and a 
method of representation through media (as in photography, videography, 
audiography etc.).  
Several terms are used for such recording practices in the context of art 
pedagogy. Alongside such names denoting the intended [fixed] product, such 
as ‘aesthetic’ or ‘visual diary’, ‘journal’ or ‘portfolio’, terms like ‘mapping’ 
or ‘charting’ stress specific recording practices. In contrast to purely text-
based diaries, recordings can utilize not only linguistic means (written 
speech) but also combine diverse representational modes of media. 
To record something is not a new practice. Most writers, academics and 
artists use different forms of notation to be able to capture their brief experi-
ences in form of sketches, graphs, notes etc. preferably in a timely and mo-
bile manner (cf. Engler, 1992; Dewey, 1934). 
Since the mid-18th century, those notations have increasingly become bi-
ased by their authors’ subjectivity and autobiography. Provided that the nota-
tions survive, they can be recognized as the textual or visual construction and 
representation of the author’s ideas, arguments or imaginations. They be-
come references. 
In the 20th century, both, writers and researchers in the field of literature 
studies, have referred to this phenomenon as ‘recordings’ or ‘notes’. The 
‘literature of recording’ was thereby characterized as a literary abridgement, 
which occurred in form of a collection of autobiographic notes written in a 
rather colloquial, ephemeral register and style. It is to be noted that this style 
of writing occurred increasingly in certain periods of the 20th century (i.e. the 
1930s, 1960s and 1990s). (cf. Lappe, 1991: 32; cf. Niemuth-Engelmann, 
1998; Dittberner, 1996, 1998) 
In conceiving these texts not as accidental traces but rather as written re-
sponses to affects, we retrospectively arrive at an approximation of an ex-
perience that possibly occurred and thus transcend the visible manifestations. 
In my doctoral thesis, I interpreted the recurring productive practice of writ-
ing as a response to a crisis of representation within the medium of written 
speech and thereby also of the literary repertoire. Although this hypothesis is 
rather presumptive, it shall nevertheless hint at how experience can manifest 
itself in a medium, here: in written speech as the application. 
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Recording and Experience 
The fact that recordings in the form of personal testimonials also have their 
relevance in the educational context is shown not only by the current discus-
sions on issues like portfolio learning and web logs. However, the way in 
which the interrelationship between recording and experience in the re-
cording process actually works and how this may be productively used for 
art classes has not yet been examined so far and shall therefore be outlined in 
the following paragraphs. 
The transformation of a suffering self into an extrovert and thereby out-
lined, responding self happens within the recording process. Therefore, re-
cording can be seen as a tool of response, which does not merely document 
an experience but brings it into existence. Experience is formed through the 
process of recording, and therefore the recording process, as a media-
determined kind of response, plays a genuine role in our creation of meaning. 
While we record, we are faced with many decisions with regard to the pro-
cess of translation into the format used for recording. 
By asking ourselves, for instance, how we can describe or visualize a 
certain experience, we witness the pre-occurrence of the ‘not-yet’. It is ex-
actly this pre-occurrence that constitutes the aesthetic productivity of re-
cordings. Only during the provisional process of recording do performative 
dynamics appear: In the process of graphing the order of experience becomes 
the experience of ordering. The articulation of experience becomes the ex-
perience of articulating. The representation of experience becomes the ex-
perience of representing. In this way, the recording process creates the fis-
sure along which experience breaks. The recording process makes the fragil-
ity of experience visible through its pauses, gaps and traces, while at the 
same time is itself created. 
By inscribing themselves into the medium in the form of pauses, gaps or 
ruptures, the break lines do not only structure the finished product, but also 
its process of creation (and thus also experience) at the moment of graphing. 
We can thus use the manifestations to trace the way in which the break lines 
of experience shine through in the recording or how the recording process 
itself produces the intermediate sphere of fragmented experience.  
The relevance of this interrelationship for art pedagogy lies in the fact 
that the recording process as a publication strategy geared towards the indi-
vidual represents a self-determined use of media, which cannot only lead to 
Bildung (education) and thus generate experience, it can also make the or-
ganisation of experience visible as the dynamic orientation of Bildung.  
In order to examine and reflect upon such visualisations of experience, 
and to substantiate particular art-pedagogical questions, we require a connec-
tion to the empirical implementation. 
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Experience = Empiricism 
Experience in its translation means ‘empiricism’. In its colloquial use, how-
ever, ‘empiricism’ mainly refers to academically applied (observed and man-
ageable) experience in the form of data. I would now like to propose that by 
combining Waldenfels’ understanding of the term experience with the prin-
ciples of recording we would find connections to a qualitative empirical 
social research.  
In the 1920s, the Viennese developmental psychologist Charlotte Bühler 
laid the foundations for an empirical debate on recording processes, more 
precisely teenagers’ diaries; coincident with the period of time that Lappe 
identified as the beginning of the genre ‘literary recording’. 
While the diaries she analysed were only in retrospect declared refer-
ences and studied under developmental psychological perspectives, by using 
recordings I developed an art-pedagogical method that, at the same time, also 
provides a method of data collection. I thereby have gained the advantage of 
not doing one-sided research about aesthetic experience, but rather study it 
by looking at an art-pedagogical application. In order to get a clearer picture 
I will shortly draft the setting. 
Setting 
During a seminar on ‘Aesthetic Research” at the art-pedagogical department 
of the University of Dortmund in 2003, I set my students the following ob-
jective: ‘Find a topic or question of your choice – not related to art – which 
you want to examine over the course of this semester, and choose an appro-
priate means of recording”  
In reference to the data collection method ‘photo elicitation’ drafted by 
Douglas Harper (Harper, 2003: 414), I called this stimulus ‘elicitation of 
graphing’ to point out the stimulative nature of the process and its underlying 
structures of government. The collected data consists of 55 different audio-
visual and written recordings, which were produced over the course of six 
months. My research question on which basis I examined the recordings with 
respect to their relation to experience read: “How do recordings reflect (in-
visible) aesthetic experiences?” Why is qualitative research suited for this 
kind of study? 
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Qualitative Empirical Research  
Qualitative empirical social research concentrates on the experiences of oth-
ers between the poles of academic research and society where, on the one 
hand, social aspects become the objects of academic research and, on the 
other hand, the knowledge of social science carries the potential of changing 
society and thereby contains a political or ethic dimension, respectively. 
Within this area of conflict, collective as well as individual experiences are 
discussed. 
In contrast to quantitative research, methods of qualitative research con-
sider ‘the perspectives of the individuals involved, the subjective and social 
structures of their world’, with ‘the openness to the world of experience, their 
inner state and their principles of structure’ being the ‘central starting point 
for the development of an object-based theory”. (Flick, 2003: 17) 
The attempt to reconstruct the other’s subjective creation of sense and 
meaning made qualitative research not only become attractive to the field of 
educational studies and explains its rapid circulation, it also serves to sensi-
tise, “discover and describe alien worlds”. (Oswald, 2003: 79) According to 
Uwe Flick, qualitative research should, therefore, “always be recommended, 
where a yet scarcely studied realm of reality is to be explored”. (Flick, 
2003: 25) 
This is the case if you look at (aesthetic) experiences of academic stu-
dents as well as if dealing with the question of the relevance of studying 
graphing/recording in the context of empirical research. 
Following Seydel’s research of interrelations between aesthetic experience 
and biography, I will analyse (aesthetic) experience in view of specific 
graphing.  
In doing so, I regard the recording by the students to be a process of per-
formative production in which I look at the scopes of experience the students 
choose or explore as well as the kind of orientations that inscribe themselves 
within these scopes. Other questions for further research may derive as an 
outcome. 
Prior to sketching the research steps required for rebuilding recording 
process, I will outline the basic assumptions underlying this reconstructive 
methodology. 
Basic Assumptions of a Reconstructive Methodology 
Reconstructing a subjective process of ‘making sense’ as ‘self-sense’/’self-
meaning’ and studying the structures and processes that are inaccessible to 
observation requires a methodology ‘which is not normatively prescribed”, 
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but “developed, based on the reconstruction and analysis of the processes of 
(re)cognition in everyday life”. (Bohnsack, 2003: 25) Taking this praxeolog-
cial methodology, which Ralf Bohnsack developed for the documentary 
method of interpretation, as a starting point, I have designed a data collection 
method – ‘elicitation of graphing’ – which makes others practise a media-
based responding to own questions, processes of research or Bildung. 
The praxeological methodology is grounded on the basic assumption of 
an existing implicit knowledge. Or, put differently: The knowledge-
sociological premise of implicit knowledge only even allows for a recon-
struction of experience. 
Implicit Knowledge 
Implicit knowledge is closely linked to experience; at least with the corporal 
part of experience, which is tied to the practices of performance/doing. Like 
in art, where thought correlates with the motor skills of the hand without 
being able to explicate it, for instance while painting a picture or playing the 
piano etc., implicit knowledge only just spawns what is being practised. 
Thus, it does not only produce a subconscious structure that can be as-
cribed to certain rules or regulations. The implicit knowledge, beyond the 
practical level, rather appears as an implicit knowledge formation or struc-
ture; it is productive itself. In the performative realization of an experience, 
knowledge eludes itself through implicit knowledge, it is inaccessible, it is an 
imperfection, a ‘not-knowing’ and just thereby it organises experience, in-
scribes itself, as it were, into experience as a trace – as I have conveyed with 
Waldenfels. The implicit knowledge becomes a trace, which “testifies with-
out testifying. It is, if you like, testament to the disappearance of the witness. 
It is testament to the disappearance of experience.” (Derrida, 1998: 221)  
As early as 1959, Polanyi outlined how this ‘implicit knowledge’ is not 
simply a part of everyday activities, but also a fundamental element of all 
cognitive processes and thereby of great relevance to the practice of aca-
demic research. (Polanyi, 1959: 73) I would like to add the thesis that habit-
ual knowledge will also be constitutive, i.e. governing aspect for any aes-
thetic practice. 
By choosing a ‘genetic approach to analysing’ and by ‘[aiming] at the 
question of how social reality is being created interactively and experience-
like’, reconstructive social science presumes that implicit knowledge con-
tributes to the creation of reality by organising it and by “manifesting itself in 
this process of creation”. (Bohnsack, 2003: 194) The implicit knowledge 
becomes – and this is where a reconstruction of experience should ensue – 
the precondition of comprehension in so far as it functions like a Movens 
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(purpose): it motivates and organises an ongoing action, activity or practice. 
It provides the basis for the momentum within the experience of performing 
and so for the experience of graphing as well. In addition, ‘implicit know-
ledge’ and experience can be perceived as a pre-structuring or grounding of 
future experiences of performing because – as already mentioned above – it 
serves “as an implicit knowledge formation or structure beyond the practical 
level”. (Bohnsack, 2003: 23) 
 
Postulate of Unfamiliarity 
In addition to the action-governing function of implicit knowledge, another 
basic methodological assumption refers to the communication between re-
searchers and their research subjects/objects. In his ‘crisis experiments” the 
founder of ethnomethodology, Harold Garfinkel, showed together with his 
students by means of communicational dysfunctions that utterances made 
while communicating are not automatically tied to a certain meaning. Rather, 
“linguistic expressions are indexical, i.e. they are merely signs of meaning” 
that are subject to interpretation. (Bohnsack, 2003: 19) 
In everyday life, this is barely recognised as an interpretation effort, be-
cause one always already circulates in a culture or subculture, a social back-
ground or generation, i.e. a shared ‘conjunctive world of experience’ (as 
Mannheim called it) and the actors “tacitly imply the intelligibility of what 
they signify one another.” (Strübing, 2004: 389) 
But if this daily practice were transferred to the field of academic re-
search, this implication would first of all connote that a shared ‘conjunctive 
world of experience’ existed and secondly that within this ‘conjunctive world 
of experience” researchers have always already ‘understood’ what the others 
would signify; otherwise they would be unable to represent the other at all. 
Any research, just like any attempt to understand the unfamiliar, would 
be superfluous because the unfamiliar, and thus also experience itself, would 
just no longer emerge. The process of understanding would simply mean to 
rediscover the Me in the You. Not proceeding on the assumption that re-
searchers and research subjects/objects share the same world of experience 
under the postulate of unfamiliarity, the question of how to transcend from 
the conjunctive world of experience into the communicative becomes perti-
nent. 
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Recording – The Transition into the ‘Communicative World 
of Experience« 
 
The mode of transition from the conjunctive into the communicative world 
of experience is generally – for the actors mutely – regulated by the data 
collection method and reconstructed by the analysis method. The researchers 
often structure in advance the media-related freedom of the respondent by 
the ‘power of question’, thus rarely getting an image/picture for an answer to 
an interview question. (cf. Derrida, 2003: 15; Bodenheimer, 2004) 
In order to leave those who are subject to research the structuring of the 
communication with regard to the study of the relevant topics, I have de-
signed the data collection method in such a way as to let them also choose 
the medium to be used to communicate. I hereby relate to the studies of the 
educational researcher Horst Niesyto who analysed the ‘indigenous produc-
tion of media’ in view of childhood and adolescence research. (Niesyto, 
2001) The media-based ‘transition’ on the part of the research subjects gen-
erates an additional counter-horizon to the researcher. 
In light of my art-pedagogical focal point, I have, in reference to Wal-
denfels, established that the transmutation of what affects us into what we 
respond to constitutes exactly the in-between where an aesthetic self-Bildung 
(self-formation) genuinely commences. By giving over this in-between space 
to the others I installed an additional methodical monitoring and I developed 
another means of reflection with regard to the experience and the mode of 
articulation respectively. 
Furthermore, the postulate of unfamiliarity not only is an assumption that 
carries relevance for the following interpretation of graphings. The unfamili-
arity is, in fact, not just single-sidedly postulated, but methodically controlla-
ble in so far as the students themselves decide whether or not to proceed on 
the assumption of a shared conjunctive world of experience in their recording 
and whether or not to view their recorded experiences as principally possible 
to share or to communicatively interpret. 
The Problem of the Base Sentence 
The potential significance of this methodological modification for the reflec-
tion of experience foreshadows in bringing to mind that the problem of the 
base sentence or respectively the question of how an observation or experi-
ence can be transformed into a [] of observation is left to the others to an-
swer. 
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Especially with regard to the students’ aesthetic experiences that are to be 
reflected, the media-related dimension of ‘transition ‘ is of enormous impor-
tance, due to being the one that is practised in the graphing process and 
thereby manifested. 
More than any other means of ‘recording’, in which observations are 
translated into sentences of written records, graphings serve as a methodical 
control mechanism that certainly “sharpens and specifies the distinction of 
‘data’ (original texts) and interpretations by the researcher” (Bohnsack, 2003: 
196). But the fact that here the research subjects, the others, are graphing 
entails a methodological and art-pedagogical combination of accessing the 
experience of unfamiliarity, particularly if recording is perceived as the in-
strument to respond to an affect. 
Graphings clearly illustrate that the base […] problem is inseparably 
linked to another dimension, namely the connection between a theory and its 
object in question or observation: Depending on how the relation between 
theory and experience forms itself within a recording, another mode of ar-
ticulating experience emerges, necessitating another methodical control 
mechanism. 
As a result, the practice of recording becomes immensely important in a 
methodological context because the formation of experience and theory de-
pends on how something is recorded, noted or documented. Different ways 
of recording establish different references to ‘the’ reality. They only create 
the object, which is non-existent without them but comes to existence 
through them. 
Methodological Translation Steps in Research 
Once we have envisioned these basic assumptions of a reconstructive meth-
odology, we can start reconstructing the practice of recording. Due to the fact 
that the limited scope of this article does not allow for a demonstration of 
interpreting individual aesthetic experiences, I will limit myself to the ques-
tion of how they can be reflected by briefly summarizing the methodological 
translation steps I used in my research. 
As described above, I developed the ‘elicitation of graphing’ as a data 
collection method in order to draw up data that transcends the general range 
of interpreted individual texts and images as it requires to formulate a ques-
tion of your own and offers possibilities of mixed forms of graphing. Using 
the documentary method I selected one case from my extensive collection of 
data that allowed me to demonstrate that a change in structures of orientation 
is associated with changes in the recording practice, and that this change 
emerges along the temporal, physical and media-related break lines, which 
also mark the limits of analysis. 
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By describing the break lines – along with the focus-related metaphors – as 
additional indicators of media-related and physical dimensions of experience 
as well as indicators of regulatory frameworks, I was able to add a compara-
tive analytical step to the documentary method. I identified various media-
related and physical dimensions of experience with regard to breaks by com-
paring the external and internal interpretation of individual cases. It became 
obvious that the breaks only become visible against the backdrop of a unify-
ing process of comprehension, and thus perform two indicating functions. 
They do not only refer to dimensions of experience, but also to the action-
governing arranging patterns of the comprehension process by disrupting 
them. In the reconstructed moment of disruption, the implicit knowledge is 
documented along the break lines because they position experiences. They 
thus serve as indicators of reflection and point to the temporal, media-related 
and physical dimensions of experience. 
For this reason, graphings take on a huge significance in qualitative re-
search that I have combined with an additional interpretative step to the 
documentary method: the variation of graphing. Furthermore, I suggested 
that a case-internal and -external comparisons of graphings and their breaks, 
can elucidate the arranging patterns of searching against the backdrop of 
orientational patterns regarding certain age groups, social backgrounds or 
institutions.  
Recordings form the basis of all these methodological stages of transla-
tion that serve to enable reflections on aesthetic experience. Recordings thus 
become a filter for the reflection of experience. 
Recordings as a Measure of Aesthetic Experience? 
The way in which recordings become interfaces for analysing (aesthetic) 
experiences can be demonstrated by looking at their various functions: As a 
means of response, which documents experience in all its fragility by initially 
evoking it, a recording serves as an instrument which motivates and gener-
ates experience, denoting the first function of recordings. 
While recording, searching and researching processes are being initiated, 
questions arise, new scopes of imagination and experience as well as new 
possibilities to respond emerge, linked automatically to affect-based preex-
periences and attentivenesses, which in turn provide the matrix for new indi-
vidual opportunities of experience. Due to the structural recurrence of this 
process during research, graphing also becomes a means of governing, or-
ganization and orientation in the experience-making process, which denotes 
the second function. Similar to a compass that provides geographical orienta-
tion, graphing can be a navigational instrument to aid a search as well as 
enable a discursive, spatial or temporal localisation. 
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These first two functions cannot be observed. They take effect during the 
production process of recordings by organizing experiences, and become 
visible and (re-)constructible only through the following function. 
For the third function I take up the above described gesture of adherence, 
which uses recordings as a means of storage or archiving of experience-
making processes. The transformation of the fleeting experience into ever yet 
subsequent recorded manifestations is the precondition of their communica-
bility and the intersubjective traceability within the context of academic re-
search. The documenting function of storage itself implies experiences that 
are just thereby initiated. 
In the process of visualising, articulating or formulating of already exis-
tent or yet to be discovered experiences additional possibilities to experience 
arise from the production of data. 
The data collection and data production method ‘elicitation of graphing” 
was designed to be able to freely choose place and time as well as medium, 
topic and method of responding. This serves to avoid a one-sided representa-
tion of the others. Instead, this way of producing data helps others to ‘form 
their voice’. It follows the demand that the others respond in recording their 
experiences. 
The recordings in form of data produced by yourself or someone else 
then turn into references that are yet to be interpreted during the research 
process, which constitutes the fourth function: recordings become means of 
interpretation of one’s own and unfamiliar experiences during the recording 
process as well as afterwards. In this double function of reference and in-
strument, recordings also appeal to applications in the field of qualitative 
empirical research because how someone orients himself during the experi-
ence process by means of recordings depends on how experiences are inter-
preted. 
In summary, recordings as means of responding refer to different media-
related, physical and temporal experiences, methods and worlds of experi-
ences and allow the unfamiliar. They serve as a media-based and methodo-
logical connector in order to analyse aesthetic experiences. By interfering 
with experiences, they not only locate but assess them. To perceive the as-
sessment as an activity that cannot be isolated from its representation means 
to perceive recordings as a standard for representational, i.e. aesthetic experi-
ences. 
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